



SMART CONTRACT CODE SECURITY ANALYSIS REPORT

Project : Fortress Lending Platform

Customer : Jetfuel Finance

Date : 12/04/2021

Table of Content

| | |
|---|----|
| Disclaimer | 3 |
| Purpose of the report | 3 |
| Introduction | 4 |
| Audit Summary | 5 |
| Overview | 6 |
| Methodology | 6 |
| Classification / Issue Types Definition: | 6 |
| Attacks & Issues considered while auditing | 7 |
| Overflows and underflows | 7 |
| Reentrancy Attack | 7 |
| Replay attack | 7 |
| Short address attack | 8 |
| Approval Double-spend | 8 |
| Sybil attacks | 8 |
| Issues Found | 9 |
| High Severity Issues | 9 |
| Moderate Severity Issues | 9 |
| Low Severity Issues | 9 |
| Informational Observations | 10 |
| Audit Conclusion | 11 |
| Appendix | 12 |
| Smart Contract Functional Summary | 12 |
| Code Flow Diagrams | 21 |
| Slither Results Log | 24 |

Disclaimer

Hash0X reports are not, nor should be considered, an "endorsement" or "disapproval" of any particular project or team. These reports are not, nor should be considered, an indication of the economics or value of any "product" or "asset" created by any team or project that contracts Hash0X to perform a security review.

The audit makes no statements or warranties about utility of the code, safety of the code, suitability of the business model, regulatory regime for the business model, or any other statements about fitness of the contracts to purpose, or their bug free status. The audit documentation is for discussion purposes only.

The content of this audit report is provided “as is”, without representations and warranties of any kind, and Hash0X disclaims any liability for damage arising out of, or in connection with, this audit report. Copyright of this report remains with Hash0X.

Purpose of the report

The Audits and the analysis described therein are created solely for Clients and published with their consent. The scope of our review is limited to a review of Solidity code and only the Solidity code we note as being within the scope of our review within this report. The Solidity language itself remains under development and is subject to unknown risks and flaws. The review does not extend to the compiler layer, or any other areas beyond the Solidity programming language that could present security risks. Cryptographic tokens and smart contracts are emergent technologies and carry with them high levels of technical risk and uncertainty.

The Audits are not an endorsement or indictment of any particular project or team, and the Audits do not guarantee the security of any particular project. This Report does not consider, and should not be interpreted as considering or having any bearing on, the potential economics of a token, token sale or any other product, service or other asset.

Introduction

We first thank Fortress Team for giving us the opportunity to audit their smart contract. This document outlines our methodology, audit details, and results. Fortress Team asked us to review their Fortress Protocol smart contracts.

Hash0X reviewed the system from a technical perspective looking for bugs, issues and vulnerabilities in their code base. This audit report is valid for the smart contract at the mentioned commit hashes only. This audit report is not valid for any other versions of the smart contract files.

Project files

| File Name | MD5 Hash |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| FTS.sol | 16184E612400DCE0013F54FB60212FF2 |
| FAI.sol | D09CB24C6EA078EEC2F38348244E215C |
| Unitroller.sol | 2CA395D65CCA9872B141A39761850117 |
| Comptroller.sol | B9215D650D78D056DBF26DFB949FF9DF |
| FAIUnitroller.sol | D363232ED72C9F0B78DE8AB0140EF5D3 |
| FAIController.sol | 28668F1BCD8DD4BFA514789790842396 |
| SFTVaultProxy.sol | 5B2F3BA1C4777003C7BF7AE3D1914043 |
| SFTVault.sol | 538ABD88AFDC40BC1D1487216BCB5F58 |
| FortressLens.sol | CDEA199BB76B31007252700B9469371C |
| WhitePaperInterestRateModel.sol | 111F06FACC068AC86133F754F4396F40 |
| FortressPriceOracle.sol | 4E39ACF0B27511860B168F6C76C85B09 |
| FBep20Delegate.sol | F48021DCC4AF0D5AFA2B9712C61484E7 |
| FBep20Delegator.sol | 5993302613299E41D2043DF3459D858C |
| Timelock.sol | 8025863D3B4036F7FFC40E53CAD717AB |
| GovernorAlpha.sol | F6CFEA696869B67C6414B4616EA0A6F6 |

Audit Summary

Several issues were found in the first audit which were fixed by the Fortress Team and no issues were found in the revised audit of the patched version.

| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| High Severity Issues Found | 0 |
| Moderate Severity Issues Found | 0 |
| Low Severity Issues | 1 |
| Informational Observations | 3 |

The smart contract is considered to **pass** the audit, as of the audit date, if no high severity or moderate severity issues are found.

Overview

The project has 15 core Solidity files for the Fortress Protocol Smart Contract, the Fortress Protocol file that contains imports from some OpenZeppelin smart contract libraries. Code review of OpenZeppelin libraries or servers / backend system is outside the scope of this audit report. We manually reviewed each line of code in the smart contract within the scope.

Methodology

Hash0X manually reviewed the smart contract line-by-line, keeping in mind industry best practices and known attacks, looking for any potential issues and vulnerabilities, and areas where improvements are possible.

We also used automated tools like slither / surya for analysis and reviewing the smart contract. These tools often give false-positives, and any issues reported by them but not included in the issue list can be considered not valid.

Classification / Issue Types Definition:

1. **High Severity:** which presents a significant security vulnerability or failure of the contract across a range of scenarios, or which may result in loss of funds.
2. **Moderate Severity:** which affects the desired outcome of the contract execution or introduces a weakness that can be exploited. It may not result in loss of funds but breaks the functionality or produces unexpected behavior.
3. **Low Severity:** which does not have a material impact on the contract execution and is likely to be subjective.

As mentioned above, the smart contract is considered to pass the audit, as of the audit date, if no high severity or moderate severity issues are found.

Attacks & Issues considered while auditing

In order to check for the security of the contract, we reviewed each line of code in the smart contract considering several known Smart Contract Attacks & known issues

- **Potential Issue: Overflows and underflows**

An overflow happens when the limit of the type variable uint256 , 2^{256} , is exceeded. What happens is that the value resets to zero instead of incrementing more. For instance, if we want to assign a value to a uint bigger than 2^{256} it will simple go to 0—this is dangerous. On the other hand, an underflow happens when you try to subtract 0 minus a number bigger than 0. For example, if you subtract $0 - 1$ the result will be $= 2^{256}$ instead of -1. This is quite dangerous.

Finding: This contract DOES check for overflows and underflows using SafeMath libraries.

- **Reentrancy Attack**

One of the major dangers of calling external contracts is that they can take over the control flow, and make changes to your data that the calling function wasn't expecting. This class of bug can take many forms, and both of the major bugs that led to the DAO's collapse were bugs of this sort.

Finding: This smart contract uses Check-effect pattern to protect against this attack.

- **Replay attack**

The replay attack consists of making a transaction on one blockchain like the original Ethereum's blockchain and then repeating it on another blockchain like the Ethereum's classic blockchain. The ether is transferred like a normal transaction from a blockchain to another. Though it's no longer a problem because since the version 1.5.3 of Geth and 1.4.4 of Parity both implement the attack protection EIP 155 by Vitalik Buterin. So, the people that will use the contract depend on their own ability to be updated with those programs to keep themselves secure. Since this full system is a cross-chain bridge between Binance Smart Chain and Ethereum Blockchains – it is recommended to not

let users enter arbitrary chain IDs in the transfer and receipt requests which may result in a potential replay attack in the future.

- **Short address attack**

This attack affects ERC20 tokens, was discovered by the Golem team and consists of the following: A user creates an Ethereum wallet with a trailing 0, which is not hard because it's only a digit. For instance: 0xiofa8d97756as7df5sd8f75g8675ds8gsdg0 Then he buys tokens by removing the last zero: Buy 1000 tokens from account 0xiofa8d97756as7df5sd8f75g8675ds8gsdg. If the contract has enough amount of tokens and the buy function doesn't check the length of the address of the sender, the Ethereum's virtual machine will just add zeroes to the transaction until the address is complete.

Finding: This issue is not applicable to Fortress smart contracts.

- **Approval Double-spend**

ERC20 Standard allows users to approve other users to manage their tokens, or spend tokens from their account till a certain amount, by setting the user's allowance with the standard `approve` function, then the allowed user may use `transferFrom` to spend the allowed tokens. Hypothetically, given a situation where Alice approves Bob to spend 100 Tokens from her account, and if Alice needs to adjust the allowance to allow Bob to spend 20 more tokens, normally – she'd check Bob's allowance (100 currently) and start a new `approve` transaction allowing Bob to spend a total of 120 Tokens instead of 100 Tokens.

Finding: Likely impact of this bug is low for most situations. For more, see this discussion on GitHub: <https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment263524729>

Issues Found

High Severity Issues

No moderate severity issues were found in the smart contract.

Moderate Severity Issues

No moderate severity issues were found in the smart contract.

Low Severity Issues

(1) Possibility of infinite loop:

```
function execute(uint proposalId) public payable {
    require(state(proposalId) == ProposalState.Queued, "GovernorAlpha::execute: proposal can only be executed if it is queued");
    Proposal storage proposal = proposals[proposalId];
    proposal.executed = true;
    for (uint i = 0; i < proposal.targets.length; i++) {
        timelock.executeTransaction.value(proposal.values[i])(proposal.targets[i], proposal.values[i], proposal.signatures[i], proposal.eta);
    }
    emit ProposalExecuted(proposalId);
}
```

In execute function in GovernorAlpha.sol contract as well as many other places, there are loops which are not limited. If they are used with moderation, then its fine. Otherwise, it might hit the block gas limit.

Fix: Fortress team will make sure to use these functions with limited loop iterations.

Informational Observations

(1) Use latest solidity version: It is recommended to use latest solidity version as they fix many compiler levels bugs from the old versions.

(2) Use visibility External over public: If any function is not being called internally, then it is better to specify its visibility as external. It saves some gas as well.
<https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/19380/external-vs-public-best-practices>

Audit Conclusion

The fortress protocol smart contract codes were written very systematic, that we did not find any major issues in it. Hence, this code is ready for the production.

Due to the nature of the smart contract protocol, there are unlimited use case scenarios, thus it is not possible to give guarantee about the future outcomes. This audit is based on manual code analysis as well as used latest static tools.

This audit report presents all the findings based on standard audit procedure, which includes manual analysis as well as automated software tools. Smart Contract's high-level description of functions was presented in Appendix section of the report.

Audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

Security state of the reviewed contract based on extensive audit procedure scope is **"Well Secured"**.

Appendix

Smart Contract Functional Summary

FTS.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|------------------|----------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | allowance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | approve | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | balanceOf | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | transfer | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transferFrom | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | delegate | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | delegateBySig | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | getCurrentVotes | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | getPriorVotes | read | Infinite loop possibility | Votes must not be excessive |
| 11 | _delegate | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | _transferTokens | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | _moveDelegates | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | _writeCheckpoint | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | safe32 | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 16 | safe96 | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 17 | add96 | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 18 | sub96 | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 19 | getChainId | read | Passed | No Issue |

FAI.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|--------------|-------|----------------|------------------------------|
| 1 | rely | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | deny | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | add | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | sub | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | transfer | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | transferFrom | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | mint | write | No max minting | Unitroller regulates minting |
| 9 | burn | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | approve | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | push | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | pull | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | move | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | permit | write | Passed | No Issue |

Unitroller.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|---------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | _setPendingImplementation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | _acceptImplementation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | _setPendingAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | _acceptAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | fallback | write | Delegates to implementation | No Issue |

Comptroller.sol

| SI | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|----|---|----------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | getAssetsIn | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | checkMembership | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | enterMarkets | write | Infinite loop possibility | Keep fTokens limited |
| 5 | addToMarketInternal | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | exitMarket | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | mintAllowed | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | mintVerify | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | redeemAllowed | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | redeemAllowedInternal | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | redeemVerify | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | borrowAllowed | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | borrowVerify | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | repayBorrowAllowed | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | repayBorrowVerify | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 16 | liquidateBorrowAllowed | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 17 | liquidateBorrowVerify | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 18 | seizeAllowed | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 19 | seizeVerify | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 20 | transferAllowed | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 21 | transferVerify | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 22 | getAccountLiquidity | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 23 | getHypotheticalAccountLiquidity | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 24 | getHypotheticalAccountLiquidityInternal | internal | Infinite loop possibility | Keep assets limited |
| 25 | liquidateCalculateSeizeTokens | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 26 | _setPriceOracle | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 27 | _setCloseFactor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 28 | _setCollateralFactor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 29 | _setMaxAssets | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 30 | _setLiquidationIncentive | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 31 | _supportMarket | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 32 | _addMarketInternal | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 33 | _setProtocolPaused | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 34 | _setFAIController | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 35 | _setFAIMintRate | write | Passed | No Issue |

| | | | | |
|----|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| 36 | _setTreasuryData | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 37 | _become | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 38 | refreshFortressSpeeds | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 39 | refreshFortressSpeedsInternal | internal | Infinite loop possibility | Markets must be limited |
| 40 | updateFortressSupplyIndex | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 41 | updateFortressBorrowIndex | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 42 | distributeSupplierFortress | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 43 | distributeBorrowerFortress | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 44 | distributeFAIMinterFortress | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 45 | transferFTS | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 46 | claimFortress | write | Infinite loop possibility | Array length must be limited |
| 47 | _setFortressRate | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 48 | _setFortressFAIRate | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 49 | _setFortressFAIVaultRate | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 50 | _setFAIVaultInfo | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 51 | _addFortressMarkets | write | Infinite loop possibility | Array length must be limited |
| 52 | _addFortressMarketInternal | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 53 | _dropFortressMarket | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 54 | getAllMarkets | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 55 | getBlockNumber | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 56 | getFTSAddress | read | hard coded address | Keep it in a variable |
| 57 | setMintedFAIOf | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 58 | releaseToVault | write | Passed | No Issue |

FAUnitroller.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|---------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | _setPendingImplementation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | _acceptImplementation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | _setPendingAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | _acceptAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | fallback | write | Delegates to implementation | No Issue |

FAController.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|---------------------------------|-------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 | mintFAI | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | repayFAI | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | _initializeFortressFAIState | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | updateFortressFAIMintIndex | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | calcDistributeFAIMinterFortress | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | _setComptroller | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | _become | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | getMintableFAI | write | Infinite loop possibility | Keep array length limited |
| 9 | getBlockNumber | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | getFAIAddress | read | hard coded address | Keep it in a variable |

SFTVaultProxy.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|---------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | _setPendingImplementation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | _acceptImplementation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | _setPendingAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | _acceptAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | fallback function | write | Delegates to implementation | No Issue |

SFTVault.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|------------------------|----------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | deposit | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | withdraw | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | claim | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | _withdraw | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | pendingFTS | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | updateAndPayOutPending | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | safeFTSTransfer | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | updatePendingRewards | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | updateVault | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | getAdmin | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | burnAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | setNewAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | _become | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | setFortressInfo | write | Passed | No Issue |

FortressLens.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|--------------------------|----------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 | fTokenMetadata | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | fTokenMetadataAll | write | Infinite loop possibility | Keep array length limited |
| 3 | fTokenBalances | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | fTokenBalancesAll | write | Infinite loop possibility | Keep array length limited |
| 5 | fTokenUnderlyingPrice | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | fTokenUnderlyingPriceAll | read | Infinite loop possibility | Keep array length limited |
| 7 | getAccountLimits | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | getGovReceipts | read | Infinite loop possibility | Keep array length limited |
| 9 | setProposal | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | getGovProposals | read | Infinite loop possibility | Keep array length limited |
| 11 | getFTSBalanceMetadata | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | getFTSBalanceMetadataExt | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | getFortressVotes | read | Passed | No Issue |

WhitePaperInterestRateModel.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|-----------------|-------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | utilizationRate | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | getBorrowRate | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | getSupplyRate | read | Passed | No Issue |

FortressPriceOracle.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|--------------------|-------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | getUnderlyingPrice | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | setUnderlyingPrice | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | setDirectPrice | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | assetPrices | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | compareStrings | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | setAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |

FBep20Delegator.sol

| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|-----------------------|-------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | _resignImplementation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | _setImplementation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | mint | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | redeem | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | redeemUnderlying | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | borrow | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | repayBorrow | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | repayBorrowBehalf | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | liquidateBorrow | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | transfer | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | transferFrom | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | approve | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | allowance | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | balanceOf | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 16 | balanceOfUnderlying | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 17 | getAccountSnapshot | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 18 | borrowRatePerBlock | read | Passed | No Issue |

| | | | | |
|----|------------------------------|----------|--------|----------|
| 19 | supplyRatePerBlock | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 20 | totalBorrowsCurrent | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 21 | borrowBalanceCurrent | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 22 | borrowBalanceStored | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 23 | exchangeRateCurrent | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 24 | exchangeRateStored | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 25 | getCash | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 26 | accrueInterest | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 27 | seize | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 28 | _setPendingAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 29 | _setComptroller | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 30 | _setReserveFactor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 31 | _acceptAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 32 | _addReserves | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 33 | _reduceReserves | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 34 | _transferReserves | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 35 | _setInterestRateModel | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 36 | delegateTo | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 37 | delegateToImplementation | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 38 | delegateToViewImplementation | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 39 | delegateToViewAndReturn | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 40 | delegateAndReturn | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 41 | fallback function | write | Passed | No Issue |

Timelock.sol


| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|--------------------|-------|---|-----------------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | setDelay | write | caller was required to be contract itself | It should be an admin |
| 3 | acceptAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | setPendingAdmin | write | caller was required to be contract itself | It should be an admin |
| 5 | queueTransaction | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 6 | cancelTransaction | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 7 | executeTransaction | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | getBlockTimestamp | read | Passed | No Issue |

GovernorAlpha.sol



| Sl. | Function | Type | Observation | Conclusion |
|-----|--------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 | constructor | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 2 | propose | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 3 | queue | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 4 | _queueOrRevert | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 5 | execute | write | Infinite loop possibility | Keep array length limited |
| 6 | cancel | write | Infinite loop possibility | Keep array length limited |
| 7 | getActions | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 8 | getReceipt | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 9 | state | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 10 | castVote | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 11 | castVoteBySig | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 12 | _castVote | internal | Passed | No Issue |
| 13 | __acceptAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 14 | __abdicate | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 15 | __queueSetTimelock PendingAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 16 | __executeSetTimelock PendingAdmin | write | Passed | No Issue |
| 17 | add256 | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 18 | sub256 | read | Passed | No Issue |
| 19 | getChainId | read | Passed | No Issue |

Code Flow Diagrams




Contract Comptroller



Contract FAI



Contract FTS



Slither Results Log

```
root@fedrik-ThinkPad-T410:/home/fedrik/slither# slither ../Fortress-contracts/contracts/
Compilation warnings/errors on ../Fortress-contracts/contracts/FortressPriceOracle.sol:
../Fortress-contracts/contracts/FortressPriceOracle.sol:2:1: Warning: Experimental features
are turned on. Do not use experimental features on live deployments.
```

```
pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;
^-----^
```

```
Compilation warnings/errors on ../Fortress-contracts/contracts/GovernorAlpha.sol:
../Fortress-contracts/contracts/GovernorAlpha.sol:2:1: Warning: Experimental features are
turned on. Do not use experimental features on live deployments.
```

```
pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;
^-----^
```

```
Compilation warnings/errors on ../Fortress-contracts/contracts/FAIVault.sol:
../Fortress-contracts/contracts/FAIVaultProxy.sol:6:1: Error: Identifier already declared.
contract FAIVaultProxy is FAIVaultAdminStorage, FAIVaultErrorReporter {
^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).
```

```
../Fortress-contracts/contracts/FAIVaultProxy.sol:3:1: The previous declaration is here:
import "../FAIVaultStorage.sol";
^-----^
```

Traceback (most recent call last):

```
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/platform/solc.py", line 409, in
_run_solc
    ret = json.loads(stdout)
File "/usr/lib/python3.6/json/__init__.py", line 354, in loads
    return _default_decoder.decode(s)
File "/usr/lib/python3.6/json/decoder.py", line 339, in decode
    obj, end = self.raw_decode(s, idx=_w(s, 0).end())
File "/usr/lib/python3.6/json/decoder.py", line 357, in raw_decode
    raise JSONDecodeError("Expecting value", s, err.value) from None
json.decoder.JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)
```

During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:

Traceback (most recent call last):

```
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/slither_analyzer-0.7.1-
py3.6.egg/slither/__main__.py", line 721, in main_impl
    ) = process_all(filename, args, detector_classes, printer_classes)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/slither_analyzer-0.7.1-
py3.6.egg/slither/__main__.py", line 71, in process_all
    compilations = compile_all(target, **vars(args))
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 1097, in
compile_all
    compilations.append(CryticCompile(filename, **kwargs))
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 137, in init
```

```

    self._compile(**kwargs)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 987, in
_compile
    self._platform.compile(self, **kwargs)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/platform/solc.py", line 108, in
compile
    targets_json = _get_targets_json(crytic_compile, self._target, **kwargs)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/platform/solc.py", line 217, in
_get_targets_json
    force_legacy_json=force_legacy_json,
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/platform/solc.py", line 413, in
_run_solc
    raise InvalidCompilation(f"Invalid solc compilation {stderr}")
crytic_compile.platform.exceptions.InvalidCompilation: Invalid solc compilation ../Fortress-
contracts/contracts/FAIVaultProxy.sol:6:1: Error: Identifier already declared.
contract FAIVaultProxy is FAIVaultAdminStorage, FAIVaultErrorReporter {
^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).
../Fortress-contracts/contracts/FAIVaultProxy.sol:3:1: The previous declaration is here:
import "../FAIVaultStorage.sol";

```

ERROR:root:None

ERROR:root:Error in ../Fortress-contracts/contracts/

ERROR:root:Traceback (most recent call last):

```

File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/platform/solc.py", line 409, in
_run_solc
    ret = json.loads(stdout)
File "/usr/lib/python3.6/json/__init__.py", line 354, in loads
    return _default_decoder.decode(s)
File "/usr/lib/python3.6/json/decoder.py", line 339, in decode
    obj, end = self.raw_decode(s, idx=_w(s, 0).end())
File "/usr/lib/python3.6/json/decoder.py", line 357, in raw_decode
    raise JSONDecodeError("Expecting value", s, err.value) from None
json.decoder.JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)

```

During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:

Traceback (most recent call last):

```

File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/slither_analyzer-0.7.1-
py3.6.egg/slither/__main__.py", line 721, in main_impl
    ) = process_all(filename, args, detector_classes, printer_classes)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/slither_analyzer-0.7.1-
py3.6.egg/slither/__main__.py", line 71, in process_all
    compilations = compile_all(target, **vars(args))
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 1097, in
compile_all
    compilations.append(CryticCompile(filename, **kwargs))
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 137, in init
    self._compile(**kwargs)

```



```
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/crytic_compile.py", line 987, in
_compile
    self._platform.compile(self, **kwargs)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/platform/solc.py", line 108, in
compile
    targets_json = _get_targets_json(crytic_compile, self._target, **kwargs)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/platform/solc.py", line 217, in
_get_targets_json
    force_legacy_json=force_legacy_json,
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/crytic_compile/platform/solc.py", line 413, in
_run_solc
    raise InvalidCompilation(f"Invalid solc compilation {stderr}")
crytic_compile.platform.exceptions.InvalidCompilation: Invalid solc compilation ../Fortress-
contracts/contracts/FAIVaultProxy.sol:6:1: Error: Identifier already declared.
contract FAIVaultProxy is FAIVaultAdminStorage, FAIVaultErrorReporter {
^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines).
../Fortress-contracts/contracts/FAIVaultProxy.sol:3:1: The previous declaration is here:
import "../FAIVaultStorage.sol";
```